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The Pareto optimal concept does not concern with fairness or equality, it is a concept related 
to efficiency. In this paper, using techniques from the general equilibrium theory, we relate 
efficiency, fairness and stability of an economy.  
 




El concepto de óptimo de Pareto no se refiere a la equidad o la igualdad, es un concepto 
relacionado con la eficiencia. En este trabajo, utilizando técnicas propias de la teoría del 
equilibrio general, relacionamos  la eficiencia, la equidad y la estabilidad de una economía. 
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1  Introduction 
 
In this paper we discuss the relationship between Pareto optimality, social welfare 
and equality. We show that there exists an egalitarian and efficient allocation, ensuring at the 
same time, social stability. We argue that it is possible to obtain an stable, fair and efficient 
economy. We joint two classical and apparently different points of view. The point of view 
of the general equilibrium theory, following by Arrow [Arrow, K.], and on the other hand the 
point of view of the distributive justice, following by Sen [Sen, A.K.] and Rawls [Rawls, J. 
(1)]. These two and apparently antagonist points of view, can be summarized following the 
Negishi approach [Negishi, T.]. 
By efficiency we understand the efficiency in the Pareto optimality sense. The 
concept of equality considered in this work is close to the concept of the idea that John 
Rawls (1999) has called " equality of fair opportunity." Finally, stability is introduced as a 
concept of social stability of the economy, in the sense that the action of individuals who 
prefer to play in a non-cooperative way, can be blocked by the action of the rest of the 
society. 
This work is organized as follows. In the next section we introduce the main 
characteristics of the economies considered. In section (3) we analyze the relationship 
between efficiency and social welfare. Next, in section (4) we introduce some considerations 
on the egalitarianism. In section (6) we introduce the definition of unequal economy and 
some considerations on the possibilities to reach egalitarian allocations in a decentralized 
way. Finally we give some conclusions. 
 
2  The model 
 
We consider an exchange economy composed by  n consumers and l commodities  
  { } I i w u X i i i ∈ , , , = E  
where  } {1,2,... = n I  is an index set symbolizing the agents of the economy. We assume that 
the consumption set  i X  is the same for all the agents and it is  .
l
+ R  The utility functions are 
strictly concave, monotone, and continuous functions. The endowments are denoted by 
.
l
i w + ∈R  
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Definition 1 An allocation  ) ,..., ( = 1 n x x x  is a specification of a consumption 
bundle, 
l
i R x ∈  for each consumer  . I i∈   
 
Let us define the feasible set  , ) (
n l R F ⊂  as the set of consumption bundles,  
 , : , : ) ,...., ( = =















i n w x I i x x x x R F  
and the utility possibility set:  
  { } I i x u u that such x allocation an is there u U i i i
n ∈ ∀ ≤ ∈ ), ( : = R  
 
 
Remark 1  (Notation) Given an allocation  ), ,..., ( = 1 n x x x  by  ) (x u  we symbolize 
the vector  )). ( ),.... ( ( 1 1 n n x u x u  
 
Note that under the assumptions of this work, the utility possibility set is convex. 
This result follows straightforward from the concavity of the utility functions because: If 
U u u ∈
2 1,   then there exist  F ∈
2 1,x x  such  that  ) (
1 1
i i i x u u ≤  and  ). (
2 2
i i i x u u ≤  So, 
}. {1,2,..., ), ) (1 ( ) (1
2 1 2 1 n i x x u u u i i i i i ∈ ∀ − + ≤ − + α α α α  Since  F   is a convex set the 
affirmation holds. 
 
Definition 2 A feasible allocation  x is Pareto optimal if there is no other allocation 
x′ such that  ) ( ) ( i i i i x u x u ≥ ′  for all  I i∈  and  ). ( > ) ( k k k k x u x u ′   
 
From the previous definition it follows directly that the Pareto optimal concept does 
not concern with fairness. It is a concept related to efficiency in the sense that an allocation is 
Pareto optimal if there is no waste, i.e: it is not possible to improve any consumer's utility 
without making someone worse off. 
By the definition of Pareto optimality, it follows that the Pareto optimal allocations 
must belong to the boundary of the utility possibility set. The boundary of this set will be 
denoted by UP and is defined by:  





' ∈ ∈ ∀ ≥ ∈ ∃ / ∈ > , : : =  
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The next proposition is straightforward  
Proposition 1  A feasible allocation  x is a Pareto optimum if and only if 
. )) ( ),..., ( ( 1 1 UP x u x u n n ∈   
 
Proof: Since utilities are monotone and strictly concave, they are strictly monotone 
and then a feasible allocation x can be Pareto optimal if and only if the utility vector 
• ∈ . )) ( ),..., ( ( = 1 1 UP x u x u u n n  
 
3  Pareto optimality and social welfare optimum 
 
In this section we discuss the relationship between the Pareto optimality concept and 
the maximization of a social welfare function. 
We will consider a social welfare function particularly simple given by:  , : R F → λ U  
and defined as: 
 





x u x U λ λ ∑  (1) 
where ) ,..., ( = 1 n λ λ λ  is fixed and can be considered as a vector of social weights. Since the 
social welfare function should be nondecreasing in the individual utility, we can consider 
0. ≥ λ  Moreover we can assume that λ  belongs to the  1 − n  dimensional simplex  .
1 − Δ
n  
This function summarizes the social welfare associated to the allocation  , x  but certainly 
this social value changes if  λ  changes. 
Note that if the utility vector  ) ,..., ( = 1 n u u u  is associated with a Pareto optimal 
allocation  , F ∈ x  being  ) ( = i i i x u u  for each  } {1,...,n i∈  then, u is in the boundary of the 
possibility utility set. This observation suggests the next proposition: 
 
Proposition 2  The set of Pareto optimal allocations is homeomorphic to the 
simplex  .
1 − Δ
n   
 
This is a consequence of the following lemma.  
Lemma 1  If utilities  n i ui 1,..., = ,  are strictly concave, then  UP is 4 
 
homeomorphic to the  1 − n  simplex.  
 









ξ  Since ξ  
is a homeomorphism the result follows.• 
This homeomorphism is shown in figure (1) (A) for two consumers, and (B) for the 
case of three consumers. 
 
Figure 1: The homeomorphism between  Δ and UP for  2 = n  and  3. = n  
   
The proposition (2) is a straightforward conclusion of this lemma. 
Proof of the proposition: Let us symbolize by PO  the set of Pareto optimal 
allocations, so for each  UP u∈  there exists  PO ∈ x  such that  ) ( = x u u  and reciprocally. 
Consider  UP ∈ PO : φ  given  by  u x = ) ( φ  and 
1 :
− Δ →
n PO ψ  given  by 
• . = )) ( ( = ) ( λ φ ξ ψ x x  
If our interest is to find an allocation maximizing the social welfare, it is clear that 
this allocation must be chosen from the Pareto optimal allocations. Suppose that for a fixed 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ , we consider the social utility function  ), (x Uλ  so it makes sense to select an 
allocations in F   maximizing this function, i.e, solving the following maximization 
problem: 











Figure 2: The Pareto optimal allocations and the equalitarian allocation 
   
Theorem 1  For each 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  there exist a feasible allocation 
* x  solving the 
maximization problem 2 and this allocation is Pareto optimal. If utilities are strictly concave 
function this solution is unique.  
 
Proof: For each 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ   R F U → : λ  is a continuous function, since  F  is closed 
and bounded, the function attain its maximum value is in this set. Now suppose that 
* x  is 
not Pareto optimal, then, there exist a feasible allocation  x ~  such  that 
) (( = ) ~ ( ), ( ) ~ (
* * x u x u x u x u / ≥  then  • ∑ ∑ ). ( > ) ~ (
*




i λ λ   Finally, since a convex 
combination of strictly concave function is strictly concave the uniqueness of the maximum 
follows • .  
The reciprocal of this theorem holds: 
 
Theorem 2  Given a Pareto optimal allocation  x , there exists a vector 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  
such that  x  solves the maximization problem:  
  ) (
1 =
x u max i i
n
i
F x λ ∑ ∈  
ie:  . ) ( ) ( F x x U x U ∈ ∀ ≥ λ λ  Moreover if utilities are strictly concave functions then  λ  is 
the unique element in the simplex verifying  . ) ( ) ( F x x u x u ∈ ∀ ≥ λ λ   
 
Proof: If the allocation  x  is Pareto optimal then  ) ( = x u u  is in the boundary of the 6 
 
utility possibility set. Since this is a convex set, by the supporting hyperplane theorem, there 
exists  0 = / λ  such that that  . UP u u u ∈ ∀ ≥ λ λ  On the other hand 
n R+ ∈ λ  because if any 
0 < i λ  then considering the  UP u∈ /  with  i u  big enough and  i j u j = , 0 / ∀ ≤ ≤ ε  and 
epsilon < 0  and small enough then  0, > ) ( u u − λ  but this is not possible for  • ∈ / . UP u  
 
4  Efficiency and egalitarian 
  
As we have shown in the previous section, given a vector 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  there exists a 
Pareto optimal allocation  ) (λ
∗ x  such that:  
  F ∈ ∀ ≥
∗ x x U x U ) ( )) ( ( λ λ λ  (3) 
 
Let us introduce the function  R → Δ
−1 : ~ n U  defined by:  
  )) ( ( = )) ( , ( = ) ( ~
1 =
λ λ λ λ λ
∗ ∗ ∑ i i i
n
i
x u x U U  
where  ) (λ x  is the Pareto optimal allocation such that  UP u∈  verify  ))) ( ( = λ
∗ x u u  being 
). ( = u ξ λ  
Now we introduce some consideration on the egalitarian allocation,  ,
e x  
understanding as egalitarian, a Pareto optimal allocation such that every individual attains 
the same level of utility. 
 
Proposition 3  The egalitarian allocation 
e x  solving  I i u x u
e e
i i ∈ ∀ , = ) (  is the 
Pareto optimal allocation corresponding to the solution of the minimization problem:  














Proof: In [Accinelli, E.; Brida, G. Plata, L.; Puchet. M] is shown that the function 
)) ( , ( = ) ( ~ λ λ λ x U U  is strictly convex. So the first order condition is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for minimization. Let 
e λ  be the solution of this problem. It follows that 
• ∈ ∀ . , ) ( ~ = )) ( , ( = )) ( ( = )) ( (
* I j i U x U x u x u
e e e e
j j
e
i i λ λ λ λ λ  
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Proposition 4 Let 
e x  the egalitarian solution. There exist 
1 − Δ ∈
n e λ  such that 
, ) ( ) ( F x x u x u






e λ   
 
Proof:Since 
e x  is feasible and Pareto optimal allocation, from theorem (2) such 
e λ  




j 1,..., = ∀ ≥ λ λ  strictly greater for at least 
one coordinate. Then the following vector of utilities is in the boundary of the utility 





















a and ε  are chosen so that  ). ( =
1 e e u
− ξ λ  So, 
e e e u u λ λ ε >  this is absurd for definition on 
• .
e λ  
 
5  Stability of the egalitarian solution 
 
Note that among all the efficient allocations the egalitarian solution (corresponding 
to the minimum value of  ))) ( , (
* λ λ x U  is the only stable solution. Because any change in 
the parameters of the economy, imply that one agent in the economy attains a high level of 
utility but in detriment of the rest of the society. See figure (3). So, after any perturbation in 
the fundamentals of the egalitarian economy, the rest of the society will push to return to the 
egalitarian situation. In this sense it is possible to say that the egalitarian solution 




Figure 3: The equalitarian allocation 
   
The egalitarian distribution can be attained in a decentralized way, if and only if the 
distribution of the initial endowments allow that this allocation can be attained as a 
Walrasian allocation. 
The economy supporting such allocation as a Walrasian equilibrium is stable, 
because as we said, any perturbation of the fundamentals of the economy, makes that some 
individuals attain high level of welfare in detriment of the rest of the society. Note that the 
egalitarian allocation implies equal level of happiness, not necessarily the same bundle set 
for every consumer. If the egalitarian allocation is reached as a Walrasian allocation, then 
the social weights of all consumers are the same, the intuition behind this affirmation is that 
the different social groups have similar economic power. So, following [Barbosa, 
P.;Jovanovic, B.; Spiegel, M.] this situation imply that: " An economy remains in force so 
long as no party wishes to defect to the noncooperative situation, and it is reinstituted as soon 
as each party finds it to its advantage to revert to cooperation" . 
From theorem (1) for each 
1 − Δ ∈
n λ  there exist a Pareto optimal allocation  x  such 
that  . ) ( ) ( F x x u x u ∈ ∀ ≥ λ λ   So, there exist a function  UP
n → Δ
−1 : φ  defined  by 
) ( = ) ( x u λ φ  making possible to define the following path of the efficiency: 
 
Definition 3 The path  { }
1 )), ( , ( =
− Δ ∈




This definition is equivalent to the definition of the Negishi path given in [Accinelli, 
E. Hern dez, R.; Plata, L.]. 
Along the Negishi path we find the set of pairs of  UP × Δ ∈
−1 )) ( , (
n λ φ λ  
corresponding to each Pareto optimal allocation. 
Consider the function  R U → NPU : ~  defined by  
 





= )) ( , ( ~  
 where  ). ,..., ( = = ) ( 1
λ λ λ λ φ n u u u  This function, defined along the Negishi utility path reach 
it minimum at 
e λ  i.e:  
 . )), ( , ( ~ = ) , ( ~ ) , ( ~ = )) ( , (( ~ 1 − Δ ∈ ∀ ≥
n e e e e U u U u U U λ λ φ λ λ λ λ φ λ
λ  
 
John Rawls's theory of justice, it is asserted that institutions and practices should be 
arranged so that the worst off are as well off over the long run as possible, they work to the 
maximal advantage of the worst off members of society, (see [Rawls, J. (1)] and [Rawls, J. 
(2)]). Precisely, the utility obtained from the egalitarian allocation corresponds to the 
solution of maximizing the utility of those individuals who achieve worse results, i.e.,  
  { } { } n u
e u u min max u ,... = 1 UP ∈  
 
Following [Bowles, S. and Herbert, G.] that more equal countries have more rapid 
rates of economic growth could well be accounted for by a statistical association between 
measures of equality and unmeasured causes of economic growth. This observation does not 
imply, that equality per se promotes high levels of economic performance, but egalitarian 
policies are compatible with the rapid growth of productivity. The capitalist countries taken 
as a whole have grown faster under the aegis of the post Second World War than in any other 
period, and in this was the period of ascendent welfare state and social democracy. 
According with the above statements, those countries with higher growth rates, 
correspond to which social weight distribution is more unequal. Conversely countries with 





6  Welfare and markets 
  
The main question of this section is if a society based on free markets can attain the 
egalitarian allocation. 
The agents go to the market with the purpose of finding a bundle set preferable to 
their endowments, i.e., the  th i−   agent go to the market to find a bundle set 
. 1,2,..., = ), ( ) ( : n i w u x u x i i i i
l
i ≥ ∈ + R   Only an allocation being part of a Walrasian 
equilibrium can be attained in a decentralized way. From the first theorem of the welfare 
such allocations 
ln x R ∈  are Pareto optimal, and given the rationality of the agents, these 
allocation must verify that  . 1,..., = ), ( ) ( n i w u x u i i i i ≥  We denote by  RPO  the set of 
allocations  OP x∈  such that  . 1,..., = ), ( ) ( n i w u x u i i i i ∀ ≥  The corresponding levels of 
utility for this allocation are given by:  
  { } n i x u u u i i i 1,2,..., = ) ( : = ∀ ≥ ∈UP RUP  
see figure (4).  
  
 
Figure 4: Rational Pareto optimal allocations 
   
We said that given an economy E a feasible allocation 
w x  is Walrasian if there 
exists a set of prices 
l R p + ∈  such that the pair  ) , ( p x
w  is a Walrasian equilibrium for the 
economy  . E  We symbolize by  E W  the set of Walrasian allocations of a given economy 
. E  
The first theorem of welfare economics establishes a relationship between Walrasian 
allocations and Pareto optimal allocations. Since the only of these Pareto optimal allocations 
can be achieved in a decentralized way, i.e., by the unique action of the laws of economics, 11 
 
are the Walrasian allocations, the possible levels of utilities, attainable in a given economy 
depend on the distribution of initial endowments. So, it is possible that for a given economy, 
with a very unequal distribution of the initial endowments can not be attained by the only 
action of the market law the egalitarian allocation. 
The second welfare theorem says that for any Pareto optimal allocation 
P x  there 
exists a vector of prices  p  such that the pair  ) , (
P x p  is an equilibrium with transfer 
payments  ). ( =
i o
i i w x p t −  In other words, a benevolent social planner after to transfer 
wealth, can make that the economy, acting under its own laws, attaint a socially desirable 
Pareto optimal allocation in a decentralized way, i.e., as a Walrasian equilibrium. 
Let us define an unequal economy:  
Definition 4 An economy  E  is unequal if the egalitarian allocation 
e x  is not a 
rational Pareto optimal allocation. That is,  . RPO x
e ∈ /  Corresponds to an economy where 
the distribution of wealth is very unevenly.  
 
So, a unequal economy, whose agents are rational, can not attain an egalitarian 
distribution of wealth by the only action of the markets, see figure 5). To attain certain 
degree of social justice, starting with an excessively unequal distribution of endowments, 
imply the participation of a central planer able to implement a set of economic policy 
measures to this end. This affirmation can be summarized in the next proposition:  
  
 
Figure 5: An unequal economy 
    
Proposition 5  Given an unequal economy, the egalitarian distribution 
e x  can not 
be attained in a decentralized way. 12 
 
 
Proof: Since  RPO ∈ /
e x  there is a neighborhood 
ln
e x R V ⊂  of this allocation such 
that no allocation in  e x V UP∩  can be a Walrasian allocation.• 
 
Corolary 1 In an unequal economy, there exists  0 > ε  such that the levels of utility 
w u  corresponding with a Walrasian allocation verify the inequality:  . |> | ε
e w u u −   
 
Corolary 2 In an unequal economy,  RUP u
e ∈ /   
 
Let , E W ∈








 measures the relative 









measures the relative value that the  th i−  consumer assigns to the egalitarian allocation. A 
consumer prefer the Walrasian allocation 
w x  to the egalitarian allocation 
e x  if and only if 
) (
>


















i x u u  
Let us define the subset  U U ⊂
w  where  
  { } ) ( = : =
w w w n w w x u u that such x exists there u E W R U ∈ ∈  
This subset captures the attainable vectors of utilities levels that can be obtained by means of 
a Walrasian allocation. 
 
Definition 5 The following index measures how far a given economy  un E  is to 

















− ∑ ∈  
 
If for a given economy, this index is positive, then the equal distribution can be 
achieved only after transfers. 
Since utilities are not observable we can measure the degree of inequality of an 
economy from de following index: 13 
 
Definition 6 The following index measures how far a given economy  un E  is to 




















The following proposition characterizes an unequal economy: 
 
Proposition 6   Let E  be an economy which endowments are  ). ,..., ( = 1 n w w W T h e  
economy is unequal if and only if there exists an individual such that  ). ( ~ = > ) (
e e
i i i U u w u λ   
 
Proof: Since the Walrasian allocation 
w x  corresponding with this economy, must 




i i u w u x u ≥  then the egalitarian allocation con not be a Walrasian 
allocation for  • . E  
This proposition is shown in figure (5). Note that the definition of unequal economy 
does not depends on the utilities representing the preferences of the consumers. 
In accordance with propositions (5) and (6) economies with a high number of 
individual under the poverty line can not attain high levels of welfare, by the only action of 
the markets. However the second welfare theorem says that under transference it is possible 
to obtain a vector of prices supporting this allocation as a Walrasian allocation. So, to obtain 
an egalitarian economy starting from a unequal economy it is necessary to implement a set of 
measures of political economy to attain this objective. According to the second welfare 
theorem, given a Pareto optimal allocation, there exist a set of process supporting this 
allocation. Recall that a set of prices 
l R p + ∈  support the allocation x if for each allocation 
y  such that  ) ( > ) ( i i i i x u y u  then  . > I i px py i i ∈ ∀  Then the pair  ) , ( p x  is a walrasian 
equilibrium under transferences. 
Note that at the same time that an economy approach the egalitarian solution the 





7  Conclusion 
 
Free markets ensure efficiency but in some cases they can not ensure egalitarian 
allocation. In some cases the only Walrasian allocations possible to be reached by the only 
action of the free markets have associate very unequal levels of happiness. Obviously, this 
situation give place to a very unstable society, where more unhappy people can recruit for 
potential violent movements. 
In this cases the participation of a central planner can introduce stability in the 
economy, if he is able to implement measures diminishing inequality. However, as is 
increasingly recognized, the intervention of a central authority to alter the distribution of the 
income can be accompanied of heavy political and economic costs. On the other hand, those 
who would harmed by these policies (the wealthy) can organize effective political 
opposition. 
An alternative policy to that directly alter the distribution of wealth may be to 
encourage investment in technology and human capital increasing in this way the 
endowments of the workers. Technologically developed firms get more productivity and 
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